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Electric case did not involve coercion, 4 the Union Oil decision does not
necessarily indicate a complete change of judicial thinking on consignment marketing. Further clarification of this area awaits future litigation,
at which time it is hoped the Court will clearly enunciate a theory on
resale price maintenance.8 5
George Spindler
84 In United States v. General Electric, 82 F. Supp. 753 (1949), the Justice Department again challenged General Electric's distribution system of agents and consignment contracts but the Court again found the relationship of the parties to be consistent with true agencies. Of course, Union exerted far more pressure on its dealers
than General Electric, since by cancelling service station leases Union could put
them out of business. All General Electric could do was to quit supplying light bulbs,
but since most of its agents were general merchants, this would injure only one line
of products marketed by them, not their entire business.
85 It is believed that the present case will eventually be disposed of by the application of the McGuire Act and the California Fair Trade Law in favor of Union Oil.
The CAL. Bus. &P. CODE § 16902 (1964) provides that contracts for resale price maintenance are not illegal as long as the parties do not compete. Since Union Oil did not
operate any retail outlets in the Fresno, California area, it should not be prevented from
forming a valid fair-trade agreement with Simpson. Such an agreement, being legal
in California, would not violate the Sherman Act because of the provision of the
McGuire Act. Thus, if Union's "consignments" were really resale price agreements,
as the Court thought, they would be legal. It is perplexing why the Court did not itself
apply the Fair Trade statutes instead of ignoring them and finding the marketing
practices of Union to be illegal, but apparently the Court was anxious to go on record
as being opposed to retail prices which are established through consignment agreements enforced by the threat of possible loss of business franchise. The Court in remanding, provided that the Fair Trade Acts should be considered.

COMMERCIAL LAW-SUBROGATION AND PRIORITY
OF LIENS ON CHATTELS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
French Lumber Company, the purchaser, brought a bill in equity to
determine the ownership of certain funds derived from the sale of a 1959
Cadillac automobile at public auction. The purchaser had financed its
purchase of the vehicle through Ware Trust Company (the first lienor)
in February of 1959, and entered into a Uniform Commercial Code se-

curity agreement as security for its note. This agreement was duly recorded. Five months later, the purchaser pledged its existing equity in the
automobile, along with certain other security, to Commercial Realty &
Finance Company (the second lienor). With knowledge that its rights
were subordinated to those of the first lienor, Commercial duly filed its
lien on the automobile. The automobile was subsequently repossessed by
the first lienor when the purchaser defaulted in its payments on the note.
The purchaser thereupon arranged with Associates Discount Corporation
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(the third lienor) to refinance the automobile. The purchaser did not
inform the third lienor of the second lienor's security interest in the automobile. Later the third lienor, without examining the public records to
ascertain whether such an interest did exist, paid the first lienor the remaining balance of its note, and received the same marked "paid in full."
The third lienor thereupon duly recorded what it believed to be the only
lien on the chattel, and when the purchaser again became in arrears on
the note, proceeded to repossess the automobile and sold same at public
auction. From a decision awarding the proceeds of the sale to the third
lienor, Commercial (the second lienor) appealed, and the decision was
affirmed. French Lumber Co., Inc. v. Commercial Realty & Finance Co.,
Inc., -Mass.__, 195 N.E.2d 507 (1964).
The importance of this case lies in the fact that it is apparently the
first time that the equitable doctrine of subrogation was held to have
supplemented a section of the Uniform Commercial Code. This case can
be analyzed in three parts: (1) an explanation of the applicable sections
of the Code; (2) an analysis of the criteria of subrogation and how the
third lienor was properly held to be subrogated to the rights of the first
lienor; and (3) the reasons why the third lienor's negligence in not discovering the prior lien was not a bar to its recovery.
Commercial Realty, as the second lienor, contended that its rights in the
proceeds were superior to those of Associates, the third lienor, because,
under the explicit provisions of the Code,' the rights of those with conflicting security interests in the same collateral are determined: "in the
order of filing if both are perfected by filing, regardless of which security
interest attached first under § 9-204(1) and whether it attached before or
after filing. ' 2 Under this provision, the order of priorities would be:
Ware (first lienor), Commercial (second [ienor) and Associates (third
lienor).
Initially, it would appear that the Code provides that the second lienor
should have prevailed in this action because it was the first claimant to
perfect its security interest by filing.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, however, affirmed the
ruling of the lower court, holding that the third lienor acquired priority
through the equitable doctrine of subrogation.3 The court also held that
previous decisions on subrogation have not been superseded by the Code,
1MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 106 (1957).
2MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, §9-312 (5) (a). (Emphasis added.)
3 The court quoted with approval the case of Home Owner's Loan Corp. v. Baker,
299 Mass. 158, 161-62, 12 N.E.2d 199, 201 (1937): "The plaintiff having paid the debts
of the defendant out of its funds and taken its mortgage in the mistaken belief that it
would have a first lien on the premises, was not officious. In such circumstances, equity
has given relief by way of subrogation when the interest of intervening lienors were
not prejudicially affected."
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noting that section 1-103 of the Code provides in part, "Unless displaced
by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity,
including the law merchant

. . .

or other validating or invalidating cause

'4
shall supplement its provisions."
In reviewing the Code, it is significant that section 1-103 appears at the
virtual beginning of the Code. This seems to indicate that the draftsmen intended that equitable principles should govern the Code. Such a concept is
not new. There have been similar provisions in other uniform laws. 5 Courts
have ruled that an existing equitable doctrine must be clearly repugnant
to, or be specifically overruled by the statute itself in order to avoid the
applicability of equitable principles.0
The core of the French Lumber decision is the applicability of the
equitable doctrine of subrogation. The third lienor's rights were determined on the basis of the third lienor's being subrogated to the rights of the
first lienor. The equitable doctrine of subrogation 7 is specifically included
within the Code.8 Thus, it appears clear that it was intended by the authors
of the Code that the doctrine of subrogation should be made applicable
to supplement section 9-312 (5) (a).
There are two types of subrogation, conventional and legal (including
4 The court in the French Lumber case said: "No provision of the Code purports to
affect the fundamental equitable doctrine of subrogation." 195 N.E.2d at 510.
5 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 2; UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW§ 196; UNIFORM
BILLS OF LADING AcT § 51; UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT § 56; UNIFORM STOCK
TRANSFER AcT § 18.
6 Syracuse Trust Co. v. Corey, 167 Misc. 506, 512, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 349, 355 (1938): "While
the law of the State of New York has become largely statutory and there is a narrow
field left for the development of common law through judicial decision, nevertheless,
the general equity power of the court remains largely unimpaired, excepting where a
law is so rigid as to inhibit the application of equitable doctrines."
7 See generally, Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962); Jackson
Co. v. Boylston Mutual Insurance Co., 139 Mass. 508, 2 N.E. 103 (1885); Detroit Steel
Products Co. v. Hudes, 17 Ill. App.2d 514 151 N.E.2d 136 (1958).
8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504:
"(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the disposition
transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the
security interest under which it is made and any security interest of lien subordinate
thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such rights and interests even though the secured
party fails to comply with the requirements of this Part or of any judicial proceedings
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of any defects
in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured party, other
bidders or the person conducting the sale; or
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
"(5) A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty indorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of collateral from the
secured party or is subrogated to his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the

secured party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the collateral
under this article." (Emphasis added.)
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equitable). Conventional subrogation arise; by virtue of an agreement
between the interested parties.9 Legal (or equitable) subrogation, on the
other hand, arises by operation of law where certain sets of circumstances
exist. 10 Under the circumstances of the instant case, the rights of the third
lienor, by operation of law, were subrogated to the rights of the first
lienor."1 Legal (or equitable) subrogation initially requires the full payment of an existing debt. 12 In the French Lumber case, the purchaser owed
a debt to the first lienor, which the third lienor paid in full. Secondly, it
must be a debt for which another is prima rily liable,' 3 as was purchaser
in the instant case. Thirdly, the party paying the debt must not be 14a
mere volunteer, but must have some interest or right to be protected.
However, one who pays another's debt at that other's request is not considered to be a volunteer but will be entitled to be subrogated to the rights
of the party whom he has paid. 15 The purchaser in the instant case had
approached the third lienor and requested that the third lienor refinance
the automobile. And finally, there must be either an actual or an implied
understanding (as in the French Lumber case) that the party paying the
debt shall acquire the rights of the party whom he has paid. 1 Third lienor,
9Meyer v. Florida Home Finders, 90 Fla. 128, 135 'So. 267 (1925). A common use

of conventional subrogation is found in an insurance contract.
10 Dunlap v. Pierce, 336 Ill. 178, 168 N.E. 277 (1929).
11 In the French Lumber case, the court said: "It is incredible that Associates [third
lienor] would not have taken appropriate protective steps by way of an assignment
from the bank [first lienor]." 195 N.E.2d at 509. But for all practical purposes, the
third lienor did receive an assignment from the first lienor, even though it was not
a formal assignment. Cf., Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Papara, 241 Wis. 112, 118, 3
N.W.2d 730, 732 (1942).
12 American Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Manufacturing Co., 296 U.S. 133
(1935); Prairie State National Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896).
13 Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Griffen Construction Co., 280 S.W.2d

(Ky. 1955).
14 American Surety Co. of New York v. Bethlehem National Bank, 314 U.S. 314
(1941); Wilkens, Neely & Jones v. Gibson, 113 Ga. 31, 38 S.E. 374 (1901).
15 Home Savings Bank v. Bierstadt, 168 Ill. 618, 48 N.E. 161 (1897). See generally
Note, 32 MINN. L. REv. 183 (1948).
16Peek v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 242 N.C. 1, 15, 86 S.E.2d 745, 755 (1955).

The court said: "That as a general rule, one who furnishes money for the purpose
of paying off an encumbrance on real or personal property, at the instance either
of the owner of the property, or the holder of the encumbrance, either upon an express
understanding, or under circumstances from which an understanding would be implied, that the advance made is to be secured by a first lien on the property, will be
subrogated to the rights of the prior lienholder as against the holder of an intervening
lien, of which the lender was excusably ignorant." This case is very interesting in that
it is on all fours with the instant case, with the exception that the U.C.C. had not been
a.dopted in North Carolina at that time, nor has it been adopted at the time of this
writing.
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in the French Lumber case, paid the purchaser's indebtedness with the im7
plied understanding that it would acquire the rights of the first lienor.'
The second lienor also contended that even if the rights of the third
lienor were protected by the rules of legal subrogation, its negligence in
not ascertaining the second lienor's prior lien should preclude it from
asserting that right of subrogation. However, there is ample authority
that under the circumstances of this case, the third lienor's alleged negligence would not be such a bar. The subrogee may have been negligent
as to its own interests, but if that negligence does not adversely affect the
interests of a prior lienor, it will not affect the subrogee's rights. 18 Even
if a party seeking subrogation is negligent in not ascertaining the existence
of a prior encumbrance, he will not be estopped from asserting his right to
subrogation if the prior lien claimant has not changed his position by
virtue of that act of omission. 19
In the instant case the position of the second lienor was not adversely
affected. When it secured its lien, it knew that its rights were subordinated to those of the first lienor. When the third lienor moved into the
position of the first lienor, it merely caused the rights of the second lienor
to be subordinated to those of a new party. Of course, if the prior lienor
had been forced into a change of position as a result of the subrogee's
negligence, then the subrogee would be estopped from asserting his rights
20
to subrogation.
This concept of excusable negligence not being a bar in cases of subrogation was commented upon graphically by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of Iowa County Bank v. Pittz:
17See generally Note, 24 MoNT. L. REV. 161 (1962); Comment, 22 LA. L. REV. 225
(1961); Kessner, FederalCourt Interpretationof the Real Party in Interest Rule in Cases
of Subrogation,39 Neb. L. Rev. 452 (1960).
18Wall v. Mason, 102 Mass. 313, 317 (1869): "He may have been negligent as to
his own interest, but he has not been so as to either of them (grantor and creditor).
They have nothing to complain of; and no wrong can possibly be done to either
of them by transferring to him the securities which the creditors held."
19 Worcester North Savings Institution v. Farwell, 292 Mass. 568, 574, 198 N.E. 897,
899 (1935): "[N]egligence of one which does not evidence a change of position of
another is not a bar to recovery in cases of subrogation." In this case, a bank which had
furnished money to pay off a mortgage was held to be entitled to subrogation, even
though negligent in not discovering a third mortgage, since the third mortgagee had not
changed his position because of the transaction.
2
oWebber v. Frye, 199 Iowa 448, 202 N.W. 1 (1925). The court held in this case that
negligence should be a bar to subrogration under the facts presented in that the intervening lienor had been caused to change his position as a result of the intended subrogee's negligence. He had acquired a mechanic's lien on the property as a result of labor
and material expended improving it. He continued to add new labor and material after
the subrogee acquired an interest as a result of not discovering the prior mechanic's
lien and was then unjustly enriched as a result of the new improvements. Cf., Conner
v. Welch, 51 Wis. 431, 8 N.W. 260 (1881).
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From the very nature of this doctrine of subrogation, its mantle must many
times, like the garment 21of charity, cover and wipe out a number of sins of
omission or commission.
The courts have been prone to interpret the provisions of the Code
liberally rather than strictly.22 The Code, ii: has been held, is designed to
simplify rather than complicate commercial transactions.28 Subrogation
has long been considered a doctrine that readily lends itself to liberal,
24
equitable, and broad application.
In the case at bar, the court in its raticnale did not specifically rule
that the doctrine of subrogation supersedes section 9-312 (5) (a). In effect,
it ruled that it was merely stressing the in:ention of the drafters of the
Code that the concept of subrogation was, and should be, an inherent part
of the Code. This rationale is not inconsisl:ent with the modern, liberal
approach to law, which, is increasingly striking down narrow, technical
defeat rather than aid the
interpretations of statutes which too often 25
realistic and orderly administration of justice.

Robert Bromberg
21
22
23
24

Iowa County Bank v. Pittz, 192 Wis. 83, 91, 211 N.W. 134, 137 (1927).
See Note, 13 DE PAUL L. REv. 172 (1963).
Arcuri v. Weiss, 198 Pa. Super. 506, 184 A.2d 24 (1962).
Jackson Co. v. Bolyston Mutual Insurance Co.. 139 Mass. 508, 2 N.E. 103 (1885).

25 Contra, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. State Public School Building Authority, 76 Dauphin County (Pa.) Bar Ass'n, Reporter, 296 (1962). This was a trial
court case which was not appealed. The court ruled that since the surety (party seeking subrogation) had constructive notice of bank's duly filed security interest, it
should not be subrogated to the rights of that bank.

COMMERCIAL LAW-WARANTIES-PRIVITY AND
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Plaintiff was employed as the manager of a hotel. In the course of his
duties as manager he personally purchased four bottles of champagne for
the hotel. The wine was produced and bottlcd by defendant. While plaintiff and other employees were preparing to serve the wine, a cap from one
of the bottles suddenly ejected, flew through the air, and struck the
plaintiff in the eye, causing serious injury. An action was brought based
on breach of implied warranty. The trial court dismissed the complaint
upon demurrer by the defendant. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reversed the lower court's decision. Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Company,
414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964).
Two problems were faced by the court in its decision in favor of the

